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ABSTRACT
The FA-18 Hornet is a fourth-generation, supersonic, multi-role aircraft designed and
built by the Boeing Aircraft Company, primarily for use as a single-seat US Navy and
Marine Corps carrier-based strike/fighter.  The Hornet has also been successful in the dual
seat variant as both a trainer, and as a land-based aircraft for the Marines.  All A through
D variants have been marketed internationally as well.   While the newer “E” and “F”
variants are significantly different from the A through D variants in size and range and
endurance capabilities, the avionics suites and capabilities are nearly identical.  Except
where noted, discussions of operations and aircraft/aircrew workload refer to single seat
operation, as that is the majority of the combat operation of the FA-18s currently in the
inventory. The purpose of this study was to examine the need (from specific operational
experience) in the single seat FA-18 for a jam resistant, long range, high bandwidth
datalink for the Strike mission, and how the Multifunctional Information Distribution
System (MIDS) and its integration into the Hornet can fill that need.  The author‘s
operational analysis was done primarily on personal notes and observations during
combat operations in Afghanistan October through December of 2001 and combat
v
operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom from February through April of 2003.  The
capabilities and limitations of the current LINK-4 system in the FA-18,  the newer Digital
Communication System’s Variable Message Format and finally the MIDS/LINK-16
systems were considered, along with difficulties of MIDS integration into the current FA-
18.  This analysis was done partially on data and experience obtained as the Project
Officer assigned to the MIDS program, however all conclusions and recommendations are
independent of the test program.
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PREFACE
A portion of the information contained within this thesis was obtained during the
developmental phase of the MIDS program at Naval Air Systems Command, Strike Test
Squadron (now VX-23) between June of 1996 and December of 1997.  Other data was
obtained through operational activities between October 2001 and April 2003, while
deployed with Strike Fighter Squadron One Nine Two and Carrier Air Wing Five.  The
research,  results and conclusions and recommendations  presented are the opinion of the
author and should not be construed as an official position of the United States
Department of Defense, the United States Navy, the Naval Air  Systems Command,
Boeing Aircraft Company, or MIDSCO.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The FA-18 Hornet is a fourth generation, supersonic, multi mission carrier based aircraft.
Originally designed primarily as a single seat replacement for the aging A-4, A-7, and F-4
aircraft, it evolved into the leader in the concept of “Strike Fighter” and a true multiple
mission capable aircraft.  Since inception, the two seat training version (FA-18B) has
evolved into operational FA-18D aircraft used by the US Marine Corps, and by several
foreign military sales customers.  Still, only the single seat version of the original FA-18
(now the FA-18C model) is utilized on board aircraft carriers due to fuel constraints and
ability to bring back any ordnance for carrier landings.  The newer FA-18 E and F models
are significantly larger aircraft with much greater bring back capability, and both models
are being introduced to the carrier environment.  With the elimination of the A-6 Intruder
attack aircraft, and the nearly complete phasing out of the F-14 fighter aircraft, the FA-18
has become the mainstay of the US Navy’s Strike Fighter aircraft capability. This was
illustrated most recently in Afghanistan and Iraq during Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  All Hornet sorties flown from Aircraft Carriers in both of these
operations were single seat.  The advances in avionics, aircraft reliability, and computer
systems have enabled a single pilot to accomplish multiple missions, often in a single
sortie, but in many cases with a higher workload than is found in multiple crew tactical
aircraft.  As mission tasking has been added, very little has been deleted from the
responsibilities of the single seat pilot.  At the same time, the nature of strike warfare
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(including the concept of “network centric warfare”) the proliferation of immediate and
detailed meida coverage of combat action results, and the evolving political environment
has increased every aircrew’s workload by decreasing almost every margin for error in
combat.  This, coupled with the popular mantra of “more for less” and the very real
cutbacks in combat resources has highlighted combat efficiency as perhaps the primary
metric in any conflict.  Efficient and timely distribution of relevant information decreases
workload and increases efficiency and accuracy in almost any endeavour.  The effect is
multiplied in combat.
The FA-18 has always included a data link capability in its avionics suite.  The current
Link-4 capable data link system,  however, is extremely limited, and is primarily used to
perform Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS) approaches in the FA-18.  Although
Link-4 can be and is used in training and in conjunction with the E-2C Airborne Early
Warning aircraft as well as several air warefare capable battle group ships, it is not secure,
it has no resistance to electronic countermeasures (jamming) and can only cater to eight
participants at a time.  It is still important to mention because of its role in ACLS
approaches and the continuing need for that function.
The purpose of this thesis is to delineate the need for and benefits of a robust, jam
resistant, and jointly interoperable secure data link in the FA-18, and how the
Multifunctional Information Distribution System (MIDS) integration into FA-18 can fill
that need.   In order to acomplish this clearly, a basic understanding of tactical data links,
specifically utilizing the Link-16 message standard and the hardware/software suites used
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to support that message standard is useful.  This thesis will cover an introduction to
MIDS/Link-16, and its already established capabilities, then go into some depth involving
the single seat carrier based Strike fighter mission (with emphasis on the Strike mission
and recent conflicts).  Finally, the  integration of MIDS-Low Volume Terminal (MIDS-
LVT) into the FA-18 and current issues will be covered, and conclusions and
recommendadtions made.  The appendices cover MIDS FA-18 installation, the FA-18
Air-to-Air mission with MIDS, and J-Series messages in more detail, including a some
FA-18 MIDS-driven displays.
Background
Because of the existence of the F-14, when the FA-18 was being developed it was never
intended to be the air defense fighter for the carrier battle group.  The culture that wrote
specifications for the FA-18 was one from which  there had always been fighter aircraft
and attack aircraft, and because the missions were seen as completely different, the
aircraft produced for those missions were completely different and equipped differently.
In fact, the original designation of the FA-18 was the A-18.[1]  The concept of a “Strike
Fighter” was new and many believed it would never be possible for a single aircraft to
accomplish both missions, certainly not a single aircraft crewed with only a single pilot,
and to say nothing of additional missions on top of those.  The A-4 and A-7 aircraft,
while in the business of attack or “strike” as it is more commonly known now, were both
single seat aircraft, but they belonged to the “Light Attack” community, which set them
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apart from the A-6 Intruder which could carry more bombs and was designed to fly in
instrument conditions at low level, requiring a more complex (and expensive) radar system
and a bombardier/navagator to accomplish the mission.  Since the FA-18 was to replace
the A-4 and A-7 fleet initially, it did not warrant the terrain following ability of the A-6
nor the Fighter communications or data link capabilities of the F-14.  Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS) was being developed for aircraft, and would
eventually be fitted to the F-14 aircraft, which at that time still had a service life that
would extend well into the forseeable future.  F-14 upgrade programs were already in
plans to make the platform viable well beyond 2005.  Because of the rapid advances in
computer technology, and the fact that the FA-18 was truly a software-based fighter from
the begining, it rapidly overtook the A-6 in precision bombing, and made the integration
of newer and smarter weapons orders of magnitude easier.
Concurrently the A-6 fleet was experiencing wing problems, and the plan for the A-12
attack aircraft probably also led to a lack of enthusiasm for pouring money into upgrading
or fixing the current A-6 fleet, resulting in an acceleration of the retirement of the A-6.
The FA-18 quickly put to rest any doubts about the ability of a single pilot to perform
either the Strike or the Fighter mission.  It was more accurate than the A-6, it was more
maneuverable than the F-14, and did not suffer from engine problems which plagued the
F-14 with the TF-30 engines. It was also the most maintainable tactical aircraft on the
carrier.  The FA-18 continued to get strong support in part because the leaders of the
community, in an effort to prove its worth, continually told higher authority that the FA-
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18 could take on additional tasking.  The advances in cockpit and system design which
were integrated into the FA-18 included a highly accurate and reliable Inertial Navigation
System (INS) and a color moving map display, alleviating the need for a separate
navigator.  Control of the weapons systems was greatly simplified in both the Air-to-Air
and Air-to-Ground arena, however, the pilot still needed to be familiar with delivery
parameters.  And now, the pilot needed to be familiar with virtually every weapon in the
inventory.  This now included mines, as that mission was accepted, several Air-to-Air
missiles, dumb bombs, laser guided munitions, cluster munitions,  and the newest Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW).  The Division
(four aircraft) still being the basic standard fighting unit of preference, the single seat
Hornet Division leader has three other aircraft to shepherd, maintain awareness of fuel
states, weapons remaining, and in tactical scenarios, which target (Air-to-Air especially,
but also applicable to aim points in Air-to-Ground operations) each flight member is
attacking.  During night operations, the Night Vision Goggles (NVGs) greatly aid in some
tasks of aircraft formation keeping and target area detection or recognition, but there are
limitations and ambiguities.  By the mid 1990s it was apparent that the F-14 would be
retiring much earlier than expected, and that the FA-18 would be (and in some cases
already had been) taking on the role of the air defense fighter for the carrrier battle group.
While the APG-73 radar installed on the latest FA-18s is much better mechanized and
suited for single pilot operations, the total power output is much less than the larger radar
on the F-14, and simple detection ranges remain significantly less than those of the F-14.
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These developments made it clear that a tactical data link would be necessary on any
viable strike fighter into the forseeable future, and the MIDS program for the FA-18 was
born.  Hanging the urgency to integrate MIDS onto the FA-18 solely on its role in the air
warfare picture, however, would be a mistake.  Based on the number of Air-to-Air
engagements the US has been involved in since the close of the Vietnam war, that might
lead one to believe that MIDS integration could be delayed or even cancelled as a
technology that is no longer needed for the current threat(s).  It certainly could be argued
that the F-14 was designed as a Mach 2+ capable aircraft because the threat had that
capability, and the FA-18, with a much lower maximum speed fills the F-14’s role in that
respect because the majority of the threat no longer exists.  The reality is that MIDS
integration is desperately needed and long overdue for its usefulness in Strike warfare,
force multiplying, battle efficiency, and saving lives and assets in friendly fire, or “blue-
on-blue” avoidance.  Like every avionics integration program, MIDS for the FA-18 has
had technical problems.  And like any other program, the technical problems either lead to
progam delays or higher cost, or (usually) both. In the case of fixed or nearly fixed
budgets, the solution is usually to delay or stretch out the program, unless it is shown
that the need is critical, and then the funds may be reallocated.
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CHAPTER II: JTIDS/MIDS, and LINK-16
Background
Joint Tactical Information Display System (JTIDS) was developed by the United States
based on 1970s technology, and integrated the capability to include jam resistance,
relatively high data rates, secure transmissions, and much greater flexibility for multiple
users. It was conceived as an aid to the complex problems encountered in Vietnam while
trying to command and control joint and single service operations.[2]  Historically,
command and control as well as surveillance and other information all had been passed
over voice radio transmissions.  Although the voice UHF radio transmissions now have
some ECM jam resistance (Have Quick frequency agility) and secure capability (utilizing
KY-58 encrypted transmission), it still is impossible to convey large amounts of
information accurately to many users simultaneously using voice circuits alone.  Tactical
Data Links were developed as a means of distributing information efficiently and
accurately, and in many instances distributing information that may be impossible to send
over a voice circuit (such as video). JTIDS is a system architecture, and several physical
sets of hardware have been designed and produced based on this archtecture. MIDS is the
name given to a system designed to fulfill the NATO operational requirement for a
flexible, secure, ECM-resistant, high capacity system also capable of supporting a wide
range of functions. The requirements for MIDS were derived from the requirements for
8
JTIDS and JTIDS is a MIDS compliant implementation.[3] Different terminal types now
in use and soon to be in use are sometimes referred to as JTIDS Class 2, or MIDS, or
MIDS LVT.  While they vary greatly in physical size, interface requirements, and
additional capabilities they all conform to the Link-16 message standard.   Interim JTIDS
Message Specification (IJMS) was a temporary message specification to be utilized on
JTIDS hardware due to the fact that the  JTIDS hardware became available before the
United States Tactical Digital Information Link –J (TADIL J) message standard was
complete.  Link-16 is a message standard based on TADIL J, but the two terms are
somtimes used interchangeably.  While it should be noted that all of the current data link
standards, including Link-16 were developed before or during the cold war, and as a result
were focused on providing air control and related information, not necessarily strike
information.  Because of the flexible nature of Link-16, however it is able to serve
multiple functional areas, including Surveillace, Air control, Fighter-to-Fighter, and others.
Appendix 3 describes the Link-16 J-Messages in greater detail.
JTIDS Architecture Technical Description
Data is conveyed on JTIDS/MIDS on UHF frequencies in the so called, “Lx band” the
band from 969 to 1206 MHz.  Transmissions are pseudo-randomly hopped among 51
frequencies spaced 3MHz apart, according to a crypto-variable driven pattern.  This
accomplishes both security (data is also encrypted on other levels before transmission)
and jam resistance, as the transmissions are spread over an entire band at different
9
Figure 1 -  JTIDS, TACAN, and IFF Frequency Band. [2]
times.[3]  Figure 1 shows the working frequency band for JTIDS with TACAN and IFF
bands annotated.
It should be noted that some TACAN and civilian IFF frequencies fall within the JTIDS
working band, and this has created problems in training and use of JTIDS networks in
peacetime, for safety reasons.  In order to alleviate some of these issues, MIDS
implements training modes which do not utilize full frequency hopping.  As the normal
combat mode of operation  would be for MIDS to hop frequencies randomly, it could not
be assured which frequencies would be utilized at any given moment.  Three major modes
are incorporated, as a result, to control the communication mode utilized.  These are:
MODE 1 –Normal mode of operation using frequency hopping, full message security and
full transmission security features (crypto encoding, etc.)
MODE 2 – No frequency hopping.  All pulses are transmitted on a single frequency and
peacetime constraints on slot usage are eliminated.
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MODE 4 – No frequency hopping and some communications security processing is
eliminated .
The limiting of frequency hopping was not sufficient to satisfy all international Air
Traffic Control concerns over TACAN and/or IFF interference when utilizing
JTIDS/MIDS in peacetime for training, therefore an Interference Protection Feature (IPF)
was also developed.  This feature monitors all transmissions from the terminal.  IPF
monitors the transmitter output for out-of-band transmissions, transmissions in the IFF
notches, improper frequency hopping distribution, incorrect pulse lengths, and several
other terminal parameters.  The IPF has the ability to disable the terminal’s transmissions
if limits are exceeded in any area. In MODE 1 operations with the MIDS/JTIDS terminal,
the IPF may be set to one of three conditions, NORMAL, EXERCISE OVERRIDE, and
COMBAT OVERRIDE.  As the names suggest, NORMAL mode allows the IPF to place
all the peacetime restrictions and monitoring on the JTIDS terminal.  EXERCISE
OVERRIDE provides a partial interference protection, most importantly allowing the
terminals to transmit more power and have more flexible use of their transmission time
slots in terms of duty factor.  COMBAT OVERRIDE effectively takes the IPF out of the
loop and no interference monitoring or protection is provided.  Both the EXERCISE and
COMBAT OVERRIDE settings must be authorized by the Battle Group Commander (or
Joint service equivalent).[3]  Also, it was conceived that, since the MIDS frequencies
were already in the TACAN spectrum, the implementation for the FA-18 would include a
TACAN capability in the Low Volume Termianal, thus simplifying some on-board
11
frequency interference issues.
JTIDS uses a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) data transmission scheme.  It
divides time as shown in Figure 2.
In short, this means that  many users can be accommodated (like in some cell phone
systems) but each user will be assigned a unique “time slot”, and can only transmit during
that dedicated time slot.  Each user, however, can listen during all other time slots.  This
system may be visualized as a repeating cycle of a collection of timeslots, as illustrated in
Figure 3.
Figure 2 - JTIDS TDMA Time Slot Architecture. [2]
12
Figure 3 - Visualization of TDMA Network Participants. [2]
As implied by Figure 3, the users can vary from tactical aircraft to command posts to
PATRIOT batteries or ships at sea.  Also important to note is that this architecture is
“non nodal”, meaning any one participant could fall out and the network will continue to
function.  Because of both the frequency hopping and the nature of TDMA architecture,
it is critical  that all participants are time synchronized.  It does not actually matter what
time standard they are synchronized to, it just matters that all users on a net are
synchronized to the same standard.  This is accomplished through course and fine
synchronizing processes, but only the network designers need be concerned with the
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details of the process.  It is fairly transparent to the end user.
The UHF frequency band was chosen for its higher available data rates, but that
constrained the system to line-of-sight communications.  However, through the use of
relays, JTIDS becomes a beyond-line-of-sight system.  Implementation of Satellite
Tactical Data Information Link J (S-TADIL J) could make a given JTIDS network
globally accessible as well.
Although some manufacturers will claim data rates as high as 230,000 bits per second,
there is overhead for data packing and error correction which brings the practical
transmitted data rate to around 57,600 bits per second.  Still, this compares well  to the
3,800 bits per second available with the Link-4 architecture.[2]
Networks
The “wheel of data” illustrated in Figure 3 is a representation of a single “network” on the
JTIDS system, using Link-16 message standards.  Remember that the JTIDS/MIDS
systems are pseudo-randomly hopping frequencies in a relatively wide band, only
transmitting on one of 51 frequencies (3MHz wide) at a time for a given net.  It is
possible for  other nets to exist simultaneously, as long as they are hopping to different
frequencies at any one given instant in time.  This is at the core of multiple network
design.  The diagram below illustrates how more than one net can exist at the same time.
Note that because the hopping is pseudo-random, it is possible for data collisions or
“pulse clashes” to occur.  For this reason, all data is sent using error correction
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Figure 4 - Multiple Network Frequency Hopping. [2]
techniques, and to minimize pulse clashes, the network number (0-128) is one of the seed
variables in the pseudo-random hopping scheme.  Figure 4 illustrates two nets operating
(one with “blue” data pulses and one with “red” data pulses).[2]
The Information
Appendix 3 goes into greater detail on what messages are implemented in the Link 16 J-
Series standard.  In summary, some key information transmitted through these messages
on a given network include the following functions:
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Precise Participant Location and Identification (PPLI)
This function, as the name implies, provides a trackfile to the user for each participant in
the current network.  This includes an unambiguous identification of the participant, its
geographic position, and can also include weapons loadout and fuel states, and platform
status.[3]
Wide Area Surveillance
Wide Area Surveillance is a general term which covers data about the tactical picture.
This air tracks (of unknown or known hostile aircraft) which may include sensor
information from several different sources, fused into a single track  containing all the
information.  Surface and ground tracks, again of unknown or hostile combatants, can be
displayed.  Points or “waypoints” which have significance can be sent over the net, rather
than via voice.  This may include re-routing information, or rendezvous point information.
Areas can be displayed as well, which may include no-fly zones or international borders.
Areas may be transmitted to show missile engagement zones or other tactical boundaries
as well.  In real time, Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) location may be transmitted over the
net (these areas, if known, may also be pre-programmed into MIDS for display in the
FA-18).  Finally, Electronic Warfare information may be displayed, showing emitters that
anyone on the net is detecting.[3]
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Air Control
In the air control arena, which is probably the greater part of what the link was originally
envisioned as supporting, commands can be sent to individual fighters or flights of
fighters.  Command and control correlations can be made using the net as well.  If an
enemy or unknown  trackfile is not yet created, but there are some sources of electronic
intelligence or other means of target detection, vectors may be sent on the net to a fighter
or flight of fighters to a cap station or to investigate and continue to search using their
own ship radars.  Appendix 2 covers a summary of possible Air-to-Air utilization of
MIDS with the FA-18.[3]
Fighter-to-Fighter
Within a flight, especially in the Air-to-Air arena, once an intercept has commenced, there
is a wealth of information which is specific to the intercept but may not be relevant to
other units not dirctly involed in that action. Fighter-to-Fighter data link is supported to
give detailed information in real time to a flight prosecuting an attack/intercept.  This
information can include targeting data, so that the flight leader and other flight member can
be assured that they are targeting the correct groups of enemy in a flight of multiple
enemy aircraft, and/or to let the leader know at a glance if there are enemy groups going
untargeted.
Within a group, the data link can  show which specific contact  has been sorted for attack
by which fighter.  “3D” information is available, in that geographic position as well as
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altitude of trackfiles is displayed. Also, the display of information is not constrained to
the radar gimbal limits.  Trackfiles may be abeam or behind the fighters, and on an egress,
as long as the AWACS or perhaps AEGIS cruiser is still tracking the contact, situational
awareness will not be lost when the contact falls outside of the fighter’s radar field of
view. [3]
Relative Navigation
The PPLI messages described above are sent by each network participating unit.  Thus it
is actually the participating unit that is broadcasting its position (as well as a host of
other information) to all others on the net.  All users are time synchronized, as noted
earlier, and the time of transmission for a given user (his time slot) is a known quantity.
Any user, then can take a received PPLI message from another user, and calculate the
difference in time between own clock and when the other user transmitted his PPLI
message.  This time is the travel time between the users at the speed of light.  Using this
time, the distance between users is calculated. Thus, the original user knows he is
somewhere on a circle that distance from the PPLI sending user.  By completing this
process for at least three unit’s PPLI messages in rapid succession, a receiving unit can
calculate his own position.  Keep in mind that the accuracy of the calculated Relative
Navigation (RELNAV) solution depends on synchronization accuracy, and the accuracy
of the location reported in the PPLI messages utilized for that RELNAV calculation.[3]
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Other Information
Engagement status may be sent from the fighter(s) back through the net for command and
control or higher authority to monitor.  In addition to pure data and messages, MIDS
includes two channels of secure digital voice transmission which  do not utilize the
aircraft’s UHF radios.  Because the voice is embedded in the data stream, if relay is used,
this equates to beyond-line-of-sight voice communications without satellites.  If
STADIL-J is implemented this can equate to global secure voice communication
capability.[2]
The possibilities extend well beyond aircraft, ships, and missile batteries.  This has
already been illustrated in the Afghanistan theater of operations. The following is taken
from an article in Jane’s Defence Weekly of 21 December 2001:
“The US successfully linked the RQ-1 Predator unmanned air vehicle (UAV), RC-
135V/W Rivet Joint signals intelligence aircraft, U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft, E-8 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS)
aircraft, and RQ-4A Global Hawk long-endurance UAV using Link 16 and other
datalink technology, US Air Force (USAF) officials said.”
“Predator images can now be sent directly to the cockpits of aircraft such as the AC-
130U Spectre gunships” USAF Gen J Jumper, USAF Chief of Staff.[4]
With the proper mission computer software in the user aircraft, these images could also
be sent to and utilized by any other net participant.
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CHAPTER III: The Need For A Tactical Data Link in the
Current Single Seat Tactical Strike Environment
Introduction
As noted earlier, today’s single seat FA-18 pilot in a combat environment is tasked with
multiple missions during a single sortie.  It is useful to delineate mission phases and their
demands in order to illustrate how MIDS integration can be useful in this environment.
Drawing from notes and logbook entries from recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
author will first outline a typical combat mission, then examine that mission in functional
areas in order to illustrate where MIDS/Link-16 will play a part in each area.
A Typical Combat Sortie in Operation Iraqi Freedom
The Air Tasking Order (ATO), or Integrated Tasking Order (ITO), delineates targets and
missions for  each operational unit in theater.  It includes in flight refueling plans, time-on-
target, aircraft type and number, and weapon type desired or required, and of course it
includes the target, hopefully with detailed aimpoint information, for each sortie or flight
(sometimes it is left to the mission commander to delineate who in a flight is responsible
for which target aimpoint).  It is important to note that the ATO or ITO is the end result
of, traditionally, a 72 hour cycle of planning.  Targets are moved up or down in priority
depending on the situation and the success of each previous day’s ATO execution.  The
battlefield picture, however, is obviously not tied to a 72 hour cycle, and in fact, can
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change rapidly during the length of a single sortie.  However, for planning purposes, the
aircrew and the ship and Air Wing team must have a working document to plan for sortie
numbers, launch and recovery times, and loads.  The ATO is received the evening prior to
the day it pertains to, and the planning cycle starts on board the ship.  On the night
schedule, the ATO may task a flight of four FA-18s to carry two one thousand pound
JDAMs, and self escort to a target area where three Desired Mean Impact Points
(DMPIs) have been identified.  The flight leader or planning team then works to acquire
imagery, to verify exact DMPI coordinates, and to plan for in-flight refueling and timing
versus distance to make the sortie fit into the ship’s cycle times (when the ship is
actually launching and recovering aircraft).  Operations from the individual squadron
tasked will identify the flight leader and wingmen.   Prior to the flight, the actual aircrew
might have only an hour or two (possibly less time) to study imagery, review any
weapon peculiarities, and to study what threats are currently predicted for the flight
(usually surface-to-air) and how to defend against or avoid them.
The flight launches into the darkness, perhaps one minute or more apart, and possibly not
in sequence (i.e. other aircraft may be launched in between members of this particular
flight).  The aircrew don NVGs and proceed to make mandatory voice calls to check in
airborne with various agencies, first the ship, then external controlling or coordinating
agencies.  Aircraft systems are re-checked airborne, especially Mode 4 Friendly/Foe
(IFF), as the lack of working and properly crypto-keyed IFF will preclude entry into
hostile territory. Once joined, the flight prceeds toward the scheduled or “fragged” tanker
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for front-side refueling.  After refueling, the flight departs the tanker and switches back to
a coordinating tactical control agency, where updates to any changes in the overall tactical
situation may be relayed, and where the mission number of the flight can be checked
against for “re-role” or reassignment for a different mission.  If the situation has changed
on the ground, often the original targets will be changed, and any pre-flight target study is
now irrelevant.  The flight is then told to contact a different agency, on an encripted UHF
radio for further tasking.  The flight leader changes frequencies and radio modes to go
secure, and attempts to contact the new agency, on a color coded frequency (i.e.
frequency numbers are not given in the clear, but the pilot carries a list of color coded
frequencies in the aircraft).  If no contact is made, or if the agency is coordinating a
different flight, the flight leader either waits for a clear moment, or returns to the last
agency for another frequency or agency.  The wingmen generally must follow the lead
through all frequency changes. Meanwhile, the flight may have to hold if transit has been
completed, prior to entering a hostile target environment.  Depending on the distances
involved from the tanker track, there may be only minutes of actual holding time available
before the flight must return to the tanker, and then either return to the ship with
unexpended ordnance (if it is a recoverable load) to make the cycle time, or request an
extension which entails identifying additional airborne fuel for the flight, and can also
affect following missions from the ship.  If a final agency is contacted successfully, they
may pass new target coordinates, which must be read back and then manually entered into
the aircraft system for weapon delivery.  The coordinates are then usually checked one
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final time between at least two flight members to ensure their accuracy and record the
voice transmission of the coordinates on tape.  The controlling agency may still have not
given an order to execute the delivery, and the flight leader will wait for that, fuel
permitting, while trying to convey an accurate  available time on station estimate to the
agency. This estimate may have changed drastically if the original destination and the new
target destination are widely separated.  After an execute order is received, the flight
proceeds to the target area, and possibly separates into two formations of two aircraft for
ease of formation keeping.  Meanwhile, fuel states are checked on the radio to ensure the
lowest state aircraft still has adequate fuel to continue.  This low state aircraft is usually
the most junior member, coincidentally, as he/she often uses the most fuel to stay in
formation.  As the flight has switched to a tactical control frequency, there is likely no
traffic avoidance  being given, and the flight clears its path using its own radars.  All the
while, PATRIOT batteries have been scanning  the skies for a possible SCUD launch,
periodically locking one of the aircraft  to check speed and direction.  Possible pop-up
Surface-to-Air threats are passed on UHF, if the cognizant agency is currently being
received.  The flight reaches the target area and delivers ordnance, attempting to train any
available on-board sensor, such as the Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) on the target
area, and recording any impact on video for later analysis as to Bomb Hit Assessment
(BHA) which is critical to feed back to the ATO process for further planning.  The flight
rejoins as expeditiously as possible and proceeds to the fragged “backside” tanker to
receive fuel necessary for the return to the ship and recovery.  Each agency contacted
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along the way needs a status report as to mission success and ordnance expended,
requiring additional radio calls.  If ordnance was unexpended, the ship must be notified,
especially if the resulting load is un-recoverable, so that a safe jettison area can be
identified and coordinated prior to recovery.
Air Traffic Management and Awareness
The first obvious use for MIDS/Link-16 is in air traffic management and awareness.
Examining the phases of a mission where this is important, one first comes to the basic
task of rendezvous and flight integrity. The timeline is tight, so perhaps one turn enroute
is allowed to attempt to join the four separate aircraft as a flight. The leader can use Air-
to-Air TACAN and three other aircraft can attain range to the leader, but the leader does
not know which wingman is ranging from him.  Once joined, the NVGs help maintain
situational awareness on the other aircraft in the flight.  Prior to close formation, however,
the sky appears completely filled with lights which look identical and give no perception
or range to the viewer.  The NVGs are monochromatic as well, so it is not possible to tell
whether a light is red or white or bright, or if it is green or blue or dim.  Aircraft have
joined on the wrong aircraft, and attempted to join on stars or ships. Use of the FA-18
radar helps to find and track aircraft in the forward hemisphere, as it provides altitude and
speed of the target aircraft, filling in the picture of who and where the correct aircraft is to
be joined upon.  In the end, while checking in and accomplishing other administrative
tasks with a coordinating agency, the second UHF radio is utilized for inter-flight
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communication in order to expedite the joinup.  With MIDS, each member of the flight
and indeed any aircraft which is participating in the net can be displayed in the cockpit on
the Multi Purpose Color Display (MPCD).  Using Relative Navigation (RelNav) these
tracks are highly accurate in position, and can clearly identify not only aircraft type but
aircraft identification–something probably not possible using NVGs unless in a tight
parade formation. Confusion over whether one is joining on his lead or on another
wingman is eliminated, and no voice transmission is necessary, freeing the flight lead to
focus on coordinating the check-in or next tanking phase of the flight.
The assigned tanker may be in a stack of tankers spaced two thousand feet apart
vertically, but in the same geographic area, therefore indistinguishable with the NVGs
until an altitude can be confirmed.  The tanker will usually utilize an Air-to-Air TACAN
as well, so the flight lead is forced to switch his Air-to-Air TACAN off the interflight
channel if ranging to the tanker is desired.   The tanker is usually found utilizing radar and
correlating geographic position with expected altitude and Air-to-Air TACAN ranging ,
although at range, the altitude which the radar resolves can easily read the wrong
thousand-foot level, and it is also possible that the tankers, on their own coordination
frequency, have consolidated and/or simply changed the altitude that they are operating
at, possibly for convenience, or possibly for weather considerations.  The UHF radio is
again utilized to sort out the position and confirm the tanking plan.  With MIDS/Link-16,
the tanker would be joined on the net, and again, the track displayed on the MPCD,
enabling a voice communication-free rendezvous.  Further, if there are other flights just
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approaching or just leaving the tanker, and they are on the net, they will be displayed, not
only in the forward hemisphere, but behind the aircraft on the moving map.  Using Link-
16 for tanker position awareness also frees the radar to remain exclusively in search in
case there is a non “linked” aircraft in the vicinity or in the flight path ahead.  The Link
picture is constant and automatic, so more time can be devoted to visual lookout and
effecting a safe and expeditous rendezvous.
In the target area the same holds true for traffic avoidance and management.  There is no
need to radar lock a contact (setting off its radar warning gear) that already correlates to a
friendly track.  While there may be contacts that are friendly and not on the net, due to
equipment malfunction or to lack of a JTIDS/MIDS system installed, anyone who is on
the net is by default a friendly.  This greatly clarifies the Air-to-Air picture.
There is another advantage of position-keeping utilizing MIDS vice current methods.
Besides the reduction in confusion and UHF transmissions, the Air-to-Air TACAN can
become a thing of the past.  MIDS utilizes a frequency hopping scheme, which has a
lower probability of detection and certainly lower probability of tracking than an Air-to-
Air TACAN system, which is continually radiating on the same frequency for the exact
purpose of ranging to another aircraft.  Abandoning the TACAN in a tactical environment
by no means ensures stealth or low observability, but it decreases transmissions, lowering
observability, and moves at least in the right direction.
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Inter-flight Tactical Information
MIDS incorporates the ability to have Fighter-to-Fighter data Link, which is designed for
use within, say a flight of four aircraft.  Fighter-to-Fighter data link includes information
that is pertinent to that flight and flight leader, but not necessarily to everyone else on the
net.  Tactical calls on UHF radio can be reduced or eliminated between the flight members,
as that data will be passed from the mission computer through MIDS to the other flight
members.  Also available is weapon status and inventory, and further, what  target is
being attacked in an Air-to-Air engagement, eliminating redundant targeting and errors in
sorting.  These information exchanges should in no way be discounted, and are very
important, especially if the scenario should ever involve a complicated air threat,
however, in the recent conflicts, there was  little or no need for targeting data, as the air
threat was minimal or non-existent.  Still, in the day to day defense of the Carrier Battle
Group, many transmissions could be eliminated during an intercept, which decreases
emissions which  may be exploited by the enemy, even during peacetime.  When
unknown contacts are detected and the alert aircraft launched to intercept and identify,
there are almost always follow-on launches if the target remains unknown, continues to
close on the battle group, or is identified as a “bandit”.  In these cases, the fighters are not
initially in the same area, and the last fighter launched has much less situational awareness
than the first. Fighter-to-Fighter data link enables the joining fighter to gather information
of the current situation, including the lead fighter’s position, and target(s) he may be
tracking,  without making lengthy calls to both the air warfare commander and the lead
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fighter.  This instantly improved mutual support and frees the lead fighter to concentrate
on detecting, tracking, identifying, and/or intercepting and escorting the target, rather than
trying to talk the joining fighter into the current situation.   Handoff for escorts, given
differing fuel states of the fighters can be made more logically and more efficiently.
Target Data/ Go and No-go Sortie Efficiency
As was mentioned, in the majority of combat sorties recently in Afghanistan and in Iraq
no fixed target was known and assigned prior to launch of the sortie, or the target changed
in flight.  In each case, there are several bits of information that the aircrew need to
accomplish the mission.  In the case of a GPS guided munition, the only information
needed is the precise target coordinate, and clearance to actually deliver the weapon.  In
the case of LGBs or other munitions, the aircrew might need at least a description of the
target, along with target coordinates at least precise enough to be able to point the sensor
of choice such that the field of view covers the target, and again, clearance to drop on the
target.  In a more dynamic Close Air Support (CAS) environment, this may then involve
multiple exchanges of data, target descriptions, confirmations, and positions of friendly
forces.  We will limit this discussion to the non “traditional CAS” environment.  While
traditional CAS is still a very important and viable tactic, a complete discussion would be
beyond the scope of this thesis.  In addition, CAS and modern techniques for information
exchange in the CAS environment are covered well in discussion of the Digital
Communication System radio installation in the FA-18.[5]
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For conventional tagets, including targets of opportunity, time is always of the essence.
Friendly forces may or may not be in the immediate vicinity of the targets, and the
friendly presence may not be conventional, i.e. the entire friendly force may consist of a
single CIA operative moving in an enemy area, and identifying target locations.  In all
cases, the information to be passed includes target position (hopefully precise
coordinates) and whether it is safe/clear to deliver the weapon.  Until the Strike aircrew
has this information, he is merely burning precious airborne fuel.
In Afghanistan  in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, up to 50% of a given FA-18 strike aircrew’s
combat sorties did not expend ordnance.  In the author’s experience and in interviews
with fellow aircrew, until the last week of “hot war” the number one reason for
unexpended ordnance was the inability to receive target coordinates and clearance within
the time  allowed by fuel on board.  The targets were there, and were eventually serviced
by aircraft in another wave, but the frequencies may not have been workable for UHF
(including Have Quick) voice communicaton, or a single controller was overloaded by
UHF communication, attempting to hand targets off to several strike flights
simultaneously, but only able to handle a single flight at a time.  In some cases a target or
target area would be passed to aircrew late in the vulnerability time (Vul time) only to
realize that the distance could not be covered with the time remaining, but it could have
been covered if the coordinates had been known ten or fifteen minutes earlier.  Airborne
fuel equals airborne loiter time.
At first glance, it may seem that simply increasing the amount of tanker fuel airborne
29
would eliminate this problem. While no FA-18 pilot would vote for less fuel airborne, the
reality is that tanker fuel can be a hugely limiting factor on an overall campaign.  In fact,
the number of strike sorties available in both OEF and OIF was limited by the amount of
fuel which could be made available in the air.  In OIF, the limiting factor may have been
the availablility of fuel itself, rather than the number of tankers, in OEF, the great
distances the tankers had to cover contributed to the difficulty of getting each pound of
fuel into an airborne fighter in theater.[6]  In either case, each additional pound of fuel
airborne brings with it overhead for transporting that fuel.  As the airborne fuel picture
became clearer, early in OIF, the USS Kitty Hawk and Carrier Air Wing Five (CVW-5)
devised an “all organic” tanking plan which involved an in-flight top-off from S-3 aircraft
off the ship in the same cycle, and then a small in-flight refueling prior to recovery on the
“backside”.  In cases where the target coordinates and clearance to drop were received in
the transit into country, a mission into the Baghdad area dropping two 1,000 pound
JDAMs could be accomplished with only the frontside tanking, using the backside fuel
airborne for fuel emergencies or unforseen recovery problems.  On the other hand, if no
target coordinates/clearance was received in a timely manner, the strike aircraft had to
carry their ordnance twice the distance, using more fuel and forcing a recovery with 2,000
pounds less fuel available for additional approaches.   In essence, since each launch and
recovery can be considered a hazardous activity, each and every sortie flown from the
aircraft carrier, puts these resources at risk.  This is of course a fact of war,  the aircraft
must be launched with ordnance.  However, if successful delivery of ordnance is a
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measure of success, than the efficiency of all the operations from the beginning of the
conflict up until a cease fire or a virtual cease fire might only be 60%.  This would imply
that perhaps 40% of those combat sorties did not need to be launched, or, perhaps more
importantly, that if the efficiency was increased, up to 40% more sorties would have been
successful resulting in the necessary targets being destroyed much more rapidly, which
could lead to a much more rapid cessation of hostilities.  The “Shock and Awe” term so
commonly used in OIF would have had a new meaning if 40% more ordnance had fallen in
the first two weeks of the conflict.
The use of MIDS in the FA-18 to pass precise target data and operational orders to
deliver to the targets can directly and immediately increase the efficiency of the combat
sorties flown.  Since the network is always available, there is no contention for a clear
UHF frequency for a single flight.  Also, a given controller on the ground, linked with
JTIDS, can input multiple targets for servicing simultaneously.  The importance of
accurate coordinate transfer cannot be over emphasized in the area of collateral damage.
While never desireable, collateral damage has become politically unacceptable and perhaps
a factor that can hinder the overall progress of a campaign by creating negative opinion
and the slowing of resources to execute and finish the conflict quickly.   Using MIDS for
the transfer of this data,  the accuracy of the coordinates can be checked on the ground, or
at a command center, instead of in a cockpit whilst flying.  While not currently
implemented, precision coordinates, formatted for weapon entry, could easily be sent
over MIDS and transferred directly into the FA-18 mission computer, and thence to a
31
GPS aided munition, taking input or transcription error in the cockpit out of the loop.
The coordinates can still be checked by the pilot, and a sensor from the aircraft may still
be trained on the desired target, but the responsibility for accuracy will be shifted to the
entity inputting the coordinates into the net, which in many instances may be the
individual closest to the target anyway, perhaps especially in the case of time sensitive
targets.  A significant gain in efficiency will be realized by simply receiving information
on the target area, thereby enabling “smart” routing of the flight from the tanker to the
combat zone.
While the ending of the conflict and the winding down period will inevitably include a
very high percentage of sorties with unexpended ordnance, this is to be expected, to
maintain a credible combat presence, and to be on call for any flare-up of activity.  But
even in the waning stages of a conflict, the ability to quickly and accurately receive target
data will make the firepower airborne more efficient and more responsive.  On the
command and control side, the planners and commanders will have an immediate picture
of what ordnance is available airborne, and what loiter time is available for any given
aircraft.
Blue on Blue Deconfliction
Perhaps the most important aspect of MIDS integration on any platform which is in a
hostile fire zone is its inherent friendly identification capability.  As covered previously,
the JTIDS network is a frequency hopping, TDMA architecture, and the frequency
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hopping scheme is dependent upon cryptovariables.  In addition, all of the data
transmitted is encoded utilizing cryptovariables.  Any track which is transmitting an ID
on the network is by default a friendly track.  This is reflected in the track type and the
information about each individual track.
Every combat aircraft in Operation Iraqi Freedom was required to have Mode IV IFF
capability prior to entering the combat area.  But Mode IV IFF return is no more
geographically precise than a Mode 3C IFF return used in civilian air traffic control.  The
IFF return on a given radar scope must be correlated to a “skin paint”, or a raw radar
return from the radar system in use.  Sometimes, depending on refresh rate, and
characteristics of the radar system in use, the Mode IV return is not exactly correlated to
a radar return, and the slower the refresh rate and the faster the contact is moving, the
worse this correlation may become, or the single aircraft appears to be two separate
contacts, one with a Mode IV friendly squawk, and one with no Mode IV and a radar skin
paint only.   Of course, the weapons systems lock on to radar skin paints, not Mode IV
returns, so the target could be engaged with the belief that it is simply in the vicinity of
friendly aircraft.   The Mode IV return does indicate that a friendly aircraft (properly
crypto-keyed) is in “that piece of sky”, but it does not contain information such as
aircraft type, callsign, etc.  And due to the correlation errors, it is entirely possible to have
multiple raw returns and IFF Mode IV returns from the same aircraft, appearing to be
completely separate contacts.
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A properly formatted JTIDS link trackfile not only contains unabiguous identification,
but also indicates speed, altitude, and other information which leaves no doubt as to not
only the friendly nature of the contact, but the type of vehicle and its current operating
information.  The JTIDS trackfile information will by default contain information that
matches what the radar return is doing.
Blue on blue incidents, otherwise known as “fratricide” or “friendly fire” have always
been a problem, really since the beginning of warfare.  Modern systems are designed to
alleviate ambiguity to the maximum extent so that operators of weapon systems have a
clear task in making a decision to fire or not to fire.  But no system has ever been perfect.
Air-to-Air systems have improved dramatically in the avoidance of blue on blue
likelihood, but there are other reasons outside of pure systems for the improvements in
Air-to-Air accuracy.  One reason is that in most instances, there are multiple operators
evaluating the available information and making decisions.  That is to say, in a typical
intercept Air-to-Air, the first entity to detect the contact may be the AWACS aircraft
with a powerful radar and perhaps other methods of identification.  Then a fighter is
vectored to intercept, and will eventually take a lock with his own radar with its own
identification capabilities.  Beyond that, both parties evaluate the geographical position,
and flight characteristics of a given contact before commiting weapons.  Rules of
engagement, are, of course implemented at every one of these steps, and in the end,
determine actions as well.  But even in  the modern Air-to-Air environment, fighter
aircraft are prone to take radar locks and identify whatever contact they detect which has
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no trackfile.  Assuming this is a friendly aircraft,  if it is a fighter, it has now had its radar
warning receiver set off and likely saturated by being locked by a friendly aircraft.  This
not only adds a nuisance alarm, noise and confusion to the locked aircraft, it renders the
radar warning receiver useless in the detection and valid alarm notification due to enemy
surface to air threats which may be currently locking the friendly aircraft.  With
JTIDS/MIDS on both combat aircraft platforms, there is no need to take a radar lock of a
friendly trackfile, and at the same time, much more information is available for all parties
involved.
Surface-to-Air combat operations can be another situation, however. This was illustrated
clearly in the most recent conflicts.  There were zero friendly aircraft downed by enemy
aircraft.  But there were friendly aircraft downed by friendly fire.  Two highly publicized
incidents included the downing of a British Tornado aircraft, and that of a United States
Navy FA-18C.  All aircrew were lost during these blue on blue incidents, and both of
these incidents were attributed to friendly PATRIOT Missile batteries.
JTIDS terminals are already integrated in many PATRIOT missile batteries, and are
continuing to be fitted.  But without MIDS integration on the air platforms, the picture
for blue on blue deconfliction will look the same to the PATRIOT operator.  However,
with MIDS integrated, and with the combat aircraft operating on the network, all of the
information mentioned above will be available to the PATRIOT operator.
This is not to say that utilizing JTIDS in all of these platforms can guarantee zero blue on
blue incidents, because ultimately each operator must be disciplined enough to utilize the
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available information when making combat decisions.  However, the task can be made
much easier by making more, relevant, and unambiguous information available to each
operator tasked with the responsibility of weapons release.
It cannot be stated with 100% certainty that JTIDS/MIDS integration would have averted
the PATRIOT shoot-downs of blue forces during OIF, but it is clear that more
information would have been available to the operators, and the overall picture would
have been clearer.  The saving of a single  FA-18C aircraft would have paid for all of the
terminals needed for the FA-18s in an air wing.  Indeed, since the FA-18C production line
is closed, there is no way to replace that lost asset.  The political, and media implications
of the blue on blue incidents cannot be quantitatively evaluated, but certainly support for
any campaign is strained by the loss of friendly forces.  It goes without saying that no
price can be put on the saving of the life of a fellow combat aviator.
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CHAPTER IV: MIDS INTEGRATION IN THE FA-18
Background
As early as the late 1980s, the requirement was identified for a  JTIDS terminal which
would be significantly smaller and have lower power requirements than the existing
terminals at that time.  Class 1 JTIDS terminals had been in use in large scale airborne and
surface command and control systems, and the Class 2 terminal was already developed
for airborne and mobile use, although the size and power requirements were still fairly
large, given the advances in technology and miniturization available.  The Class 2 LVT,
also known as MIDS was designed for use in space constrained platforms, ideal for
fighter applications.  Because of rapid technology advances, it was possible to include all
the features of the basic Class 2 JTIDS terminal and at the same time add additional
functionality.[3]   Table 1 summarizes some basic specifications of the various classes of
JTIDS terminals, including transmit power, volume and mass.  Figure 5 adds a visual
comparison of the various JTIDS Class 2 terminals.
MIDS was designed from the start to fill not only a US need, but for a NATO
requirement for a small JTIDS terminal.  Because of this, the actual hardware specification
for MIDS was developed by a consortium of companies from five nations, France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United States.  The development program has taken so
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Table 1 – Comparison of JTIDS Terminal Specifications. [7]





Volume (ft3) 1.56 3.25 BIG 1.25 0.58





1000 1000 200 200
Figure 5 - Visual Comparison of JTIDS Terminals.[7]
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long that some of the original companies have changed names, but the consortium was
dubbed “MIDSCO”.  The demonstration and validation phase was completed in 1990,
and engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) was begun in 1994 [8], but due to
some technical problems and, arguably, the nature of a five nation development program,
the first working terminal was not delivered until much later, and the first EMD test flight
in an FA-18 occurred in January of 1999.
MIDS FA-18 Integration
The MIDS LVT provides secure jam resistant communication, navigation, and
identification functions, interoperable with the JTIDS Class 2 terminals.  In addition,
since the frequencies used encompass some TACAN frequencies, the MIDS terminal
incorporates TACAN functions.  This was desireable because frequency deconfliction
between JTIDS functions and TACAN functions could be handled within the MIDS
terminal. But more critically, in the FA-18, there would be no space for the MIDS
terminal unless the existing TACAN hardware could be removed.  Installation of MIDS
into the existing FA-18 fleet requires removal of the ARN-118 TACAN, and it requires
the downsized High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) Command Launch
Computer (CLC, now CLCP).  The downsized CLCP has previously been incorporated
into many later model FA-18s.  The software capability to interface with the MIDS
terminal was to be phased in to the Mission Computer Operational Flight Program (OFP)
loads with OFP 15C Fleet load having Initial Operational Capability (IOC)[7], however,
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due to procurement rates and modification issues, 15C was introduced to the fleet in
2002/2003[9] with MIDS capabilities disabled.  A MIDS FA-18 also requires AYK-14
XN-8 Mission Computers, and a Sixth Mux Bus, a new Amplifier Control
Intercommunication (ACI) system panel and Interference Blanker Unit (IBU).  Besides
electronics and software, modifications are necessary to Bay 3R in the host FA-18 in the
form of a Shelf Structural Redesign, Environmental Cooling System (ECS) Modification,
and a power wiring modification.
Technical Challenges of Integration
Early in the integration phase of MIDS, it was realized through analysis that there would
be cooling issues in Bay 3R.  The MIDS hardware would require an ECS modification to
allow adequate cooling airflow to the bay with MIDS installed.  In part, this was a reason
given for not pursuing a higher TACAN power output capability.  MIDS with
incorporated TACAN provides up to 200 watts transmit power for TACAN ranging
functions.  The Class 2 terminal used in the F-14 allows for 500 watts of TACAN power.
The original TACAN installation in the FA-18, however, utilizing the ARN-118 has 1200
watts of TACAN transmit power available.  This was intuitively flagged even before
flight testing, while writing the test plan, as a possible problem.  At the time, however,
the manufacturers’ and designers’ assurance was that much smarter processing was
utilized in the MIDS TACAN implementation, and thus the actual range degradation
could not be determined from power output alone.  Well before 2000, it was envisioned
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that GPS would be integrated on all military aircraft, and that the TACAN system in the
United States would be phased out.  However, GPS integration and FAA certification has
not proceeded as planned, and the TACAN system is still widely used, and is the only
certified backup air traffic control method of navigating with the FA-18.  Additionally,
the Navy FA-18 does not have a civilian Instrument Landing System (ILS).  Its ILS is
specifically for shipboard operations.  Therefore, TACAN approaches are the only type
of self-contained (non ground controlled) instrument approaches certified in the FA-18.
Finally, and most importantly, the aircraft carrier still and for the forseeable future will
continue to use TACAN as the primary means of air traffic management, for departures,
marshalling prior to commencing an approach, and for instrument approaches if ILS or
ACLS is not functioning.  Even with ILS functioning, the TACAN distance measuring
equipment (DME) is cross checked for safety.  For these reasons, TACAN is still seen as
a critical capability in the FA-18.  Unfortunately, in operational evaluations which
concluded in 2003, TACAN performance and reliability was identified as being a problem
area.  This and certain wiring problems in the depot-level modifications to incorporate
MIDS have further slowed the integration.
It is worth noting that  MIDS has been successfully fielded in the FA-18E and F.  As
some modifications were made during manufacture /design, this integration was much
easier than the process of modifying already fielded fleet aircraft which may or may not
have already had the necessary number of multiplex busses and level of mission
computer.  In the Fall of 2002, VFA-41 and VFA-14 installed MIDS into their aircraft,
41
and subsequently completed work-ups and a successful deployment with MIDS
integrated.  Unfortunately, the aircraft that needs MIDS the most, in particular  the FA-
18C with lower fuel fraction on board and a single pilot, has yet to recieve MIDS for a
deployment.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The author’s main analysis was conducted using data and experiences obtained while
serving as MIDS Project Officer at VX-23 and while serving as a combat FA-18C pilot in
Afghanistan and Iraq in VFA-192 and CVW-5.  The conclusions and recommendations,
however, are the author’s own, and are independent of those aforementioned
organizations.  Single piloted high performance combat jet aircraft operations have been
made much more manageable through the automation of multiple functions such as
navigation, radar processing, systems monitoring, and weapons management.  But the
workload has increased as a result of additional tasking, multiple simultaneous missions,
and the greater emphasis now placed on zero tolerance for weapon delivery inaccuracies
and errors.  Manned combat air vehicles are still a viable delivery method of choice, as the
final delivery decision still rests with a human.  The information necessary to carry out
the modern combat strike mission is available but sometimes in multiple locations,
requiring tedious and error prone methods to retrieve that information.  The difficulty in
retreiving and integrating these multiple types and sources of information results in lower
combat efficiency and higher risk of combat errors, including midair or near midair
collisions, collateral damage, failure to provide air support in a timely manner, or blue on
blue combat losses.  The integration of MIDS into the FA-18 will simultaneously increase
the combat efficiency and the combat safety during the execution of the Strike mission.
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These benefits spill over into all other missions the FA-18 is tasked with, as well as the
training environment.  Though there have been some technological setbacks, use of MIDS
in the FA-18 has already proven to be incredibly effective in the training environment,
and the integration of MIDS into the FA-18 needs to become one of the highest priorities
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APPENDIX 1: MIDS INSTALLATION IN THE FA-18C
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MIDS Low Volume Terminal Description
Multi Functional Information Distribution System (MIDS) was born from a North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) need for a common set of hardware/software with
which to bear the Link 16 message standard.  Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS) had been in service, but a smaller hardware set, incorporating some
additional features made possible through technology advances was envisioned for MIDS.
The MIDS Low Volume Terminal, or MIDS LVT was created by a multi-national
consortium of companies and was originally chartered by the United States Department
of Defence (DOD).  MIDS is unique in that it is actually DOD’s first successful
cooperative development of an electronic systems program.  Although it is by definition a
“Joint” program, the largest first user of MIDS was to be the US Navy FA-18 Hornet.
Many capabilities of MIDS were required by the FA-18 installation, but compromises
were also made for the other platforms MIDS had to acommodate.
The MIDS LVT is a tactical, secure, jam resistant voice and data communications system
which is compliant to the LINK-16 message standard and previous JTIDS systems.
MIDS LVT is smaller, occupying only 0.58 cubic feet of space and weighing 62.8
pounds.  It has a capability for up to 200 watts (1 watt, 30 watts, or 200 watts) of
transmit power in either data transmissions or in the TACAN utilization, but it includes a
terminal capability to be connected to a high power amplifier JTIDS terminal.  The MIDS
LVT has about one quarter of the components and connections as the similar JTIDS class
50
2 terminal, resulting in more than a doubling of reliability.  The MIDS LVT hardware
configuration is one containing several shop replaceable cards, some of which can simply
be removed or never supplied if certain functionality is not required (TACAN, for
instance) and the MIDS LVT will recognize installed cards upon startup.
Included in the MIDS installation in the FA-18 is a remote power supply dedicated to the
MIDS LVT.  The remote power supply is shown beneath the main unit in Figure 6.  This
Line replaceable unit (LRU) converts platform primary power to Direct  Current (DC)
that the terminal requires. For instance, the FA-18 primary power is 115  volts
Alternating Current (AC), three phase, 400 Hz and the LVT would not be capable of
using this.  Figure 7 shows a  MIDS LVT with Power supply.
Figure 6 - MIDS LVT Exploded View and Shop Replaceable Card.[7]
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Figure 7 - MIDS LVT with Power Supply Installed.[10]
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FA-18 Physical Installation
The MIDS LVT and remote power supply replaces the existing TACAN LRU in Bay 3
Right (Bay 3R) avionics compartment in the forward right fuselage.  Figure 8 shows a line
drawing of the FA-18 and the approximate location of Bay 3R.  Figure 9 is a drawing of
the details of the Bay 3R installation with MIDS on board.  Installation of MIDS not
only requires the removal of the existing TACAN equipment, but also that the smaller
sized High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) Command Launch Computer (CLC)
be previously installed in that particular aircraft.  The shelf that the MIDS LVT actually
attaches to requires minor redesign as well, to accommodate the different shape of the
MIDS LVT hardware.
Not shown are modifications necessary to the Environmental Control System, in order to
increase the cooling airflow to Bay 3R as a result of the increased heat dissipation of the
MIDS LVT over that of the old TACAN electronics.
MIDS LVT requires that the host FA-18 already have six 1553 Multiplex busses (MUX
busses) which newer lot aircraft already have, but many existing fleet aircraft do not have.
This also requires installation of the AYK-14 XN-8 Mission computers (or later model
computers).  MIDS LVT utilizes the existing TACAN antennas for both TACAN and
communication functions, as the same radio frequency band is utilized for both.  Figure 10
Illustrates a block diagram of MIDS electrical installation in the FA-18C.  Note that this
differs from the installation in the FA-18 E and F.
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Figure 8 - Big Picture View of MIDS Location in the FA-18.[7]
Figure 9 - Bay 3R Close up with MIDS Installed.[7]













































































Because of the additional voice channels, MIDS installation requires a new throttle grip
communication switch.  The existing switch has two momentary positions of up or down,
spring loaded to the center position.  The up position is for transmitting on radio 1, and
the down position for transmitting on radio 2.  In the original installation, the volume
knobs on the up-front-control panel are used to set the volume of radio 1 and 2, but
transmissions on either radio will overlap if they occur simultaneously.  Since MIDS adds
two more (secure) voice channels, the COMM switch is replaced with a six position
switch. Up and down retain their functionality for COMM 1 and COMM 2, and the
neutral position retains it’s functionality of listening to all channels.  However, the switch
now also functions forward (MIDS Voice channel A transmit) and aft (MIDS Voice
channel B transmit).  An additional position of momentary center depression was added
which functions as a “Quick isolate” to isolate a single channel, muting the other three
possible sources of voice chatter.  Figure 11 shows the additional communication switch
positions on the right throttle grip for MIDS.  The volume controls for the MIDS voice
channels are included on a new Amplifier Control Interface (ACI)  Volume panel. Figure
12 shows the MIDS ACI Volume panel. Besides the throttle switch and the ACI panel,
the cockpit controls and physical displays for MIDS are unchanged from the non-MIDS
FA-18.
Data can be entered via the Data Display Indicator (DDI) pushtiles, the Up-Front
Control (UFC) keypad, or via Hands On Throttle and Stick (HOTAS) controls depending
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Figure 11 - Throttle Communications Switch with MIDS.[9]
Figure 12 - ACI Volume Panel with MIDS.[10]
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on the type of data to be entered.  Information is displayed to the pilot mainly on the
Multi Purpose Color Display (MPCD) however, data is also displayed on the DDIs, the
UFC scratchpad, and the Heads Up Display (HUD), dependent upon the type of data
and mission phase.  Figure 13 shows the general layout of the cockpit controls and
displays for the FA-18C.  Figures 17 through 19 (Appendix 4) illustrate representations
of individual cockpit displays with MIDS data being displayed.
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Figure 13 - Cockpit Displays in the FA-18C.[11]
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 As previously covered, MIDS provides several ares of information to the tactical aircrew
in the FA-18.  This information can be used to greatly increase the combat efficiency and
safety of the single seat pilot conducting the Strike mission.  Much of the original impetus
for the design of the Link-16 message standard and the JTIDS architecture was born from
a larger Air-to-Air threat than has been seen in recent conflicts.  Even though there was
virtually no Air-to-Air war in either OEF or OIF, there remains an Air-to-Air requirement
for protection of the battle group, for possible theaters where there would exist a large
and credible airborne threat, and from perhaps yet unimagined Air-to-Air scenarios in
unconventional warfare (e.g., intecepting and escorting or intercepting and downing a
highjacked aircraft).  The use of MIDS in the FA-18 can therefore become a key player in
Air-to-Air missions as well as Strike missions.
PPLI
As in all cases when a JU is on a given network, it must report a PPLI message.  Relevant
to the Air-to-Air mission, the PPLI message from an airborne fighter will not only contain
friendly identifaction (friendly by default because it is reporting), but geographic position
will also be sent.  In addition, the current loadout of weapons including number and type
of Air-to-Air missiles will be included in the PPLI message, along with current fuel state
of that fighter.  Platform Status (referrring to the platform’s network status, not aircraft
status-that is reported in a separate message) is also reported.  This information is
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available to the C2 unit in control of the fighters on the net, and aids greatly in making
vectoring and force placement decisions.  Fighters receive information on the position of
other fighters, helping to increase situational awareness and especially to decrease chances
of fratricide.
Wide Area Surveillance
In the surveillance picture, the JTIDS network perhaps plays its greatest Air-to-Air role.
Each JU can report on tracks, which may be hostile, unknown, or even friendly but not
on the network,  The C2 unit on that given network may also have sensor or other
information which can add to a given track, or contribute new tracks to the overall picture.
The C2 unit and other methods work together to ensure that each physical entity is
represented by only a single track on the network, and that each entity that any JU has
information on is at least represented by one track. This is something like a MACRO
version of what the FA-18 has integrated for years, Multi-Sensor Integration (MSI).
With MSI, the FA-18 may detect a target on the radar from long range, then the onboard
Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) may be slewed to that target.  If Link 4 datalink was
available from the E-2C, and the E-2C was tracking this contact, its datalinked trackfile
may be displayed in the FA-18 as well, and still other sensors may be receiving
information on this particular contact.  MSI utilizes the mission computer in the FA-18
to correlate these inputs from different sensors into a single trackfile if possible, creating
one track that has a greater amount of known information available.  With Link 4,
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however, often the datalinked file and the aircraft detected file would be a mile or more
apart in space, and correlation was not possible.  The JTIDS network using the C2 unit,
correlates with much higher accuracy, ensuring greatly decreased ambiguity, and using
sensors from multiple systems on mutiple air or surface vehicles, thus creating an
extremely accurate and complete picture of the combat environment.  Including the
surface information, this is known as the Recognized Air and Surface Picture (RASP).
Also included in the RASP are Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) Surface and ground tracks,
and electronic warfare information.  Wide Area Surveillance will also distribute
information such as points and areas of tactical significance. Figure 14 provides a graphic
of Wide Area Surveillance in action using MIDS.
Air Control
Through decades of learning how cluttered the radio can become as soon as an intercept
has been initiated (and even prior to that point) Top Gun and other weapons schools
have written volumes on the single subject of Communications Brevity.  This comm
brevity changes rather frequently, and takes memorization and repetition to learn
properly and to use effectively in the air.  Still, in the heat of battle or the heat of training,
calls become non-standard and commands are missed or mis-interpreted and correlations
are made in error.  The JTIDS network solves much of this through the use of Air Control
messages.  These messages may include commands such as “intercept” or “intercept and
escort” or “destroy”.  They can be in the form of vectors to contacts which the fighter has
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Figure 14 - Wide Area Surveillance Diagram.[7]
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 no on-board sensor information on, or vectors in a general direction in the case of no
sensor information on the network at all.  As discussed the C2 correlations play a major
role in clarifying the air picture for the fighters and all agencies on the network.
Fighter-to-Fighter
The Fighter-to-Fighter datalink function is simply a Network Participation Group (NPG)
that is specifically designed for non C2 units (NPG 19).  It is provided for the exchange of
radar sensor target information and and status, and each fighter “group” is assigned
dedicated time slots on one of possibly several “stacked nets”.  The important point to
note is that it is for the exchange of detailed data, it is a non C2 Network, and it is
designed for 2, 4, or 8 fighters per net, but not more.  The radar data exchanged is detailed
enough to provide three-dimensional information on contacts(s), and targeting data as well
as sorting data withing the flight is also exchanged on this net.
Other Information
Several other areas of information exchange are supported in the Air-to-Air arena by
JTIDS/MIDS.  Worth mentioning in addition to the above are the Engagement status
message which tells “the world” what a fighter’s engagement status is with respect to
particular targets.  This eliminates some ambiguity possible when more than one fighter
group is vectored possibly onto more than one enemy group.  The MIDS Link-16 voice
channels also warrant a mention.  They are by definition secure without requiring any
additional keying action or crypto selection by the pilot, and depending on the data rate
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they can be clearer and more intelligible than a weak UHF analog voice channel.  In
addition, using relays, the MIDS voice channels are able to have a much longer range, in
fact, beyond line of sight, for communication with distant agencies.  Fortunately or
unfortunately, the ship can always call you back.
Typical Air-to-Air Scenario Using MIDS
Figure 15 Illustrates an Air Warfare Scenario utilizing MIDS for information distribution.
To illustrate the usefulness of MIDS in the Air-to-Air arena, the six phases of an air
intercept may be briefly explained and examined.
Phase One – Search
While on CAP with radars in search mode, the fighters receive Wide Area Surveillance
data, enhancing their situational awareness.  The most fuel conserving altitudes and orbits
can be utilized, as information is received whether tracks are in the forward or rear
quarter, and initial contacts will be longer range.  When a contact is made, perhaps by the
C2 agency, the fighters are assigned the mission and given an initial vector.  This vector
may not even be necessary if a track is already created for the contact.  Target location is
passed when the track is passed on the net.  It is possible for the fighters to silence their
radars to avoid detection until the last second, thereby consummating a passive intercept.
Phase Two – Sample/Targeting
This phase in a traditional non-data link intercept is all but skipped with MIDS.  Since
the quality trackfile already exists, no sample locks need to be taken, and geometry can be
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Figure 15 – Anti-Air Warfare Diagram.[7]
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set based on the track shown on the net.
Phase Three – Sanitize
The fighters, again, do not need to sample lock therefore, they continue to remain in
search or even silent, sanitizing for a pop-up contact, and using additional network
information.  Search will continue fro additional bogeys and situational awareness can be
contributed with accuracy and precision from any wingman through datalink,
Phase Four – Sort
Within an enemy flight there may be one or more individual targets.  Sorting is the process
of assigning a specific target to a specific fighter.  This can be done on the radio, usually
prebriefed from geometry, or through pure datalink.  If geometry changes during the
intercept due to maneuvering, as  the fighters take radar locks in preparation for weapons
firing, radar lock lines appear on the MPCD, showing exactly which trackfile each fighter
is locked on.  Cross locks or redundant locks and any untargeted aircraft can easily be
identified, and the situation corrected prior to first shot range.
Phase Five – Shoot
Again, radar lock lines are shown via MIDS, and they become commit lines, and then
Target Under Missile Attack (TUMA) lines once a shot has been taken.  If the shot is
dropped that will be reflected in the datalink.
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Phase Six – Short Range Options
Traditionally a “heads out of the cockpit” phase of an intercept, information on hostile
missile launches can actually be passed, if the information is detected by some means,
over MIDS.  Missile defense may then be necessary, or it may be prebriefed to conduct a
missile defense regardless of indications, or based on radar warning indications.  Once
inside the visual arena, the nearest threat is easily identified because even if radar
situational awareness is lost, the high quaity trackfile remains on the datalink.  If visual is
lost, MIDS can be quickly referenced for the enemy position, as well as other fighter’s
positions, to prevent fratricide in a visual environment.  Post merge, the area or safe
direction can be passed from the controlling C2 unit via MIDS and can be referenced
without making a single radio call.  If  the fighters are to prosecute a trailing group,
situational awareness to that next group is instantaneous, regardless of the lack of fighter
radar data at that moment.  With exact range data, tactical errors in the decision to
continue the prosecution or to bugout can be drastically reduced or eliminated.
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APPENDIX 3: LINK 16 Message Standard/J-Series Messages
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Link-16 Message Types
While the details of message preparation and actual bit-by-bit transmission of data on a
Link 16 network is important, it should be transparent to the user and  is designed into
the architecture of the JTIDS system.  It does warrant describing the actual messages sent
over the network, as these messages define the types of data which can be conveyed on
the tactical data link.  There are only four types of messages defined in the Link-16
message standard.  These are: Fixed Format, Variable Format, Free Text, and Round-Trip
timing.  The standard messages utilized by the US Navy and many NATO users are the
“J-Series” messages, and these are Fixed Format messages.  The US Navy does not use
Variable Format messages, although some services may, for instance, the Army uses
Variable Format messages to send their Army Tactical Data Link messages over a Link-16
network.  Variable Format messages being sent on a given network are simply ignored by
a user that does not recognize them.  Free Text Messages are  used to send Link-16 voice,
and they have no set format, therefore can utilize all data bits for digitized voice (with
desired error correction).  Round-Trip timing messages are unique in two ways.  First,
they are used by all users on a network in order to achieve and maintain time
synchronization, and second, they are the only message that can be sent and received
during the same time slot (with all other message types a given user may send or receive
during a single time slot, but not do both).
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J-Series Messages
Within the Link-16 specification, which is defined in the NATO Standardization
Agreement, or STANAG 5516, there exist J-Series messages.  There are 256 possible J-
series messages, although not all 256 are currently defined.  Changes and additions to
STANAG 5516 are constantly in the process of being introduced and approved or
rejected.  Each  J-series message, being a fixed format message, consists of one or more
words, up to a maximum of eight.  Each word consists of 75 data bits, of which 70 are
data, 4 used for parity checks, and one is reserved as a spare.[3]   All tactical and
command information, aside from voice communication, is exchanged using these fixed
format messages.  There are three types of words in the fixed format world, Initial,
Extension, and Continuation. Each message consists of at least an Initial word, one or
more Extension words, and one or more Continuation words.  As mentioned, parity
checking is built into each word, using 4 bits, but each message is also encoded for error
detection and correction using a Reed-Solomon (R-S) encoding.  This adds 16 bits of error
detection and correction for every 15 bits of data transmitted, so the encoding algorithm is
sometimes referred to as (31/15) encoding (the 15 bits of data are taking 31 total bits to
transmit).  Each J-series message, then requires at least 155 bits and up to 1240 bits to
transmit in encoded form. A relatively small subset of J-Series messages warrants further
explanation, as they are used so frequently.  Figure 16 illustrates some of the current J-
Series messages as defined by the STANAG-5516. “J” identifies the message as J-series,
the digits to the left of the decimal point define the category of message, and the digits to
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Figure 16 - Abbreviated List of J-Series Messages. [3]
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the right of the decimal place define the exact message title.  “J2.2”, therefore is a J-series
PPLI message for an Airborne PPLI.[3]
PPLI
Each network participant, whether actually utiilizing a JTIDS Class 2 terminal or a MIDS
terminal, is known as a JTIDS USER (JU).  Every JU must transmit a PPLI message (for
fighter aircraft, a J2.2 message) at least every 12 seconds.  However fighter aircraft may
transmit more frequently (perhaps every 3 seconds for an F-15 or every 2 seconds for an
F-14) as this lends to greater situational awareness given the higher speeds of these
vehicles compared to ships or land based units.  The PPLI message contains the following
data for the transmitting user:
• Position of the user. This includes both the geodetic and relative grid positions with
their respective position qualities.
• The Platform Type (e.g. Fighter, Bomber, AEW, etc) and Platform Activity (e.g.
Intercepting, CAP, RTB) of the user. The Specific Type, e.g. FA-18, is transmitted in
the platform’s status message.
• The network status of the user, including such parameters as Time Quality, Relay
Status, Network Participation Status, Control Net used for Control NPG
transmissions.
• IFF Codes. The Mode 1, 2 and 3 codes being transmitted by the user's Transponder
(where applicable) may be included in PPLI messages to aid correlation between a
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received PPLI message and another user's sensor data.
• Emergency Indicator. A JU can declare in its PPLI that it currently has an on-board
emergency.
• Bailout Indicator. If the crew of an airborne JU ejects from the aircraft this indicator
can be automatically set in its PPLI messages.
• Command & Control and Flight Leader Indicators. A JU can declare that it is a C2 JU
or a non-C2 JU (set at initialization), and an aircraft JU may also declare itself as a
Flight Leader.
• Strength. A JU can operate with a number of non-JUs (or JUs which are radio silent)
and state in its PPLI message that it is reporting on behalf of a number of other units.
• Airborne Indicator. Air JUs can transmit PPLIs on the ground or in the air; this
indicator is used to indicate which is the case.
• Force Tell Indicator
• Mission Correlators
• Voice call sign.[2]
Surveillance
Tracks are reported from any JU which has appropriate sensor capability using the J3.x
messages.  The exact message number depends on the type of track (i.e. air, surface,
subsurface, land point, etc).  Specific methods exist to ensure that all tracks are reported,
and that each track is reported uniquely (i.e. two fighters reporting the same contact do
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not create two separate tracks for the network) the details of that method are beyond the
scope of this discussion.
Engagement
Appropriate to a fighter JU, engagement status is reported on the net using the J12.6
message.  This message is a “Target Sorting” message, but for a non Command and
Control (C2) unit, such as a fighter, it reports it’s own engagement status via this message,
but only on the Network Participation group for control.  To disseminate engagement
status to a wider community, the appropriate C2 unit would report a J10.2 Engagement
Status Message to all users.  The fighter reporting it’s engagement status would indicate
the track being engaged, helping to eliminate redundant targeting.
Reference Points
Reference points can actually be points, lines, or areas in space, and they may or may not
be stationary.  Normally, reference points will be transmitted by a C2 JU using the J3.0
Message.  This message can contain extremely useful tactical data, which would otherwise
be quite cumbersome to transmit via voice in real time.  Reference point messages are not
limited to, but may include:
-Hazard information (impact points, ground zero, missile launch point, engagement point,
mine,  oil rig, ecm decoy, etc.)
-General Reference Point (marshal point, corridor, search area, formation center, ship’s
projected intended movement (PIM) or submarine PIM)
76
-Station Air (Combat Air Patrol (CAP) point, Strike initial point, TACAN, Tanker, orbit
racetrack or orbit point).
Threat Warning
C2 JUs may transmit Threat Warning data to a particular JU or to all JUs on the network,
via the J15.0 Threat Warning message.  This message is given highest priority for
transmission, and may contain data about high priority threat(s) against a particular JU,
including missile or aircraft threats, including the threat posture.  They are transmitted
twice for each threat.[3]
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APPENDIX 4: FIGURES/FA-18 SCREEN EXAMPLES
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Figure 17 - FA-18 Data Display with MIDS PPLI Information.  Friendly tracks on
the network are shown from a God’s eye view (40NM scale) as green circles.
Placing the cursor over a particular PPLI track reveals more information about
that JU as shown on the right display.[10]
BRTCONTNIGHTDAYOFF
MAP DCLTR SCL/40 MK1 DCNTR

















































































IFF 1:  51
IFF 2:  1234
IFF 3:  4321
79
Figure 18 - FA-18 Data Display with MIDS Surveillance Data.  Lines for political
or tactical boundaries are shown in solid red. Possible SA-10 site with threat ring
is shown in dashed red.  Unknown tracks are yellow, hostile tracks are red. In this
case, placing cursors over a desired hostile track of interest reveals more track








































































Figure 19 - FA-18 Data Display with MIDS Fighter-To-Fighter Information.  Left
display shows the God’s eye view with two friendly fighters to the left, one
unknown contact forward and  left, and one hostile track ahead. NO IFF response
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